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Abstract 
Objectives: Metacognition refers to cognition about cognition, and encompasses both 
knowledge of cognitive processes and the ability to monitor and control one’s own 
cognitions.  The current study aimed to establish whether metacognition is impaired in autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD).  According to some theories, the ability to represent one’s own 
mental states (an aspect of metacognition) relies on the same mechanism as the ability to 
represent others’ mental states (“mindreading”).  Given numerous studies have shown 
mindreading is impaired in ASD, there is good reason to predict concurrent impairments in 
metacognition. Metacognition is most commonly explored in the context of memory, often by 
assessing people’s ability to monitor their memory processes.  The current study addressed 
the question of whether people with ASD have difficulty monitoring the contents of their 
memory (alongside impaired mindreading).   
Method: Eighteen intellectually high-functioning adults with ASD and 18 IQ- and 
age-matched neurotypical adults participated.  Metamemory monitoring ability and 
mindreading ability were assessed using a feeling-of-knowing task and the “animations” task, 
respectively. Participants also completed a self-report measure of metacognitive ability. 
Results:  In addition to showing impaired mindreading, participants with ASD made 
significantly less accurate feeling-of-knowing judgements than neurotypical adults, 
suggesting that metamemory monitoring (an aspect of metacognition) was impaired.  
Conversely, participants with ASD self-reported superior metacognitive abilities compared to 
those reported by neurotypical participants.    
Conclusion: This study provides evidence that individuals with ASD have 
metamemory monitoring impairments. The theoretical and practical implications of these 
findings for our current understanding of metacognition in ASD and typical development are 
discussed. 
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Metacognition can be broadly defined as “thinking about thinking”.  More specifically, it 
refers to an individual’s awareness of cognitions and encompasses “metacognitive 
knowledge”, “metacognitive monitoring”, and “metacognitive control”. Metacognitive 
knowledge refers to one’s beliefs and factual knowledge about cognitive processes in general 
(in self and others), whereas metacognitive monitoring and control refer respectively to one’s 
awareness of and ability to regulate one’s own current, online mental states and cognitive 
activity (Flavell, 1979).  
One extensively studied component of metacognition is metamemory, which refers to 
an individual’s knowledge of memory processes, and ability to monitor and control their own 
memory. Nelson and Narens’ (1990) influential model of metamemory divides metamemory 
(monitoring and control) processes into two levels: the “object-level” and the “meta-level”.  
The object-level consists of first-order memory processes (i.e., memory itself), whilst the 
meta-level consists of dynamic, second-order representations of the object-level.  This model 
is supported by neuropsychological (e.g., Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989; Shimamura 
& Squire, 1986) and psycho-pharmacological (e.g., Dunlosky et al., 1998) data, which 
highlight a dissociation between memory and metamemory.  According to Nelson and 
Narens’ model, through metamemory monitoring individuals create a meta-representation of 
the object-level (Nelson & Narens, 1990).  Additionally, metamemory control processes use 
information held at this meta-level to feedback to the object-level, allowing individuals to 
alter object-level processes and implement different strategies during learning (e.g., by 
allocating more study time to information that one believes one has not learnt).  It is partly for 
this reason that metamemory is considered essential for adaptive functioning, allowing one to 
tailor one’s behaviour according to one’s strengths and weaknesses in object-level memory.  
As such, if an individual’s metamemory monitoring is inaccurate the strategies they 
implement during learning are likely to be ineffective.  
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 Metamemory judgments  
One of the most commonly-used and classic paradigms to assess metamemory 
monitoring involves asking people to make feeling-of-knowing (FOK; Hart, 1965) 
judgements.  During a typical FOK task, participants are asked (during a study phase) to 
memorise a series of stimulus pairs (e.g., pairs of words, such as “pen-key”, “computer-
elephant” etc.).  Participants are then presented (during a cued-recall test phase) with one 
stimulus from each pair (the cue; e.g., “pen”), and asked to recall its missing pair (the target; 
e.g., “key”).  Importantly, on trials in which participants fail to correctly recall the target they 
are asked to judge the likelihood that, at a later point, they would be able to recognise it.  
Finally, participants are then presented with the cue and are asked to select the unrecalled 
target from several options (a recognition test phase).  The accuracy of participants’ 
judgments on metamemory tasks is typically assessed using Gamma correlations (Goodman 
& Kruskal, 1954), which measure the association between individuals’ predictions about their 
future ability to recognise the correct target with their actual subsequent recognition 
performance (see the Method section for a detailed description of how Gamma correlations 
are calculated).   
 
Metacognition as “applied theory of mind” 
 
 
Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states, such as beliefs, desires, 
and intentions, to self and others in order to explain and predict behaviour (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978).  While most research into ToM focuses on awareness of other minds 
(henceforth called “mindreading”), research into metacognition focuses on awareness of 
one’s own mind.  Indeed, given the potential role of metacognition in self-regulation, Flavell 
(2000) considered metacognition an example of “applied ToM”.  
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Several different perspectives have been proposed to explain the potential relation 
between mindreading and metacognition.  According to one perspective (e.g., Carruthers, 
2009; Frith & Happé, 1999), the ability to represent one’s own mental states (metacognition) 
relies on the same underlying metarepresentational mechanism as the ability to understand 
mental states in others (mindreading). Crucially, according to this one-mechanism theory, no 
dissociation should exist between mindreading and metacognition ability; individuals who 
demonstrate mindreading impairments should also demonstrate impaired metacognition. 
However, this proposal has been disputed.  According to a version of the “simulation theory”, 
our ability to read other minds stems from our ability to directly introspect the contents of our 
own mind, and then use this information to mentally simulate the contents of another’s mind 
in imagination (e.g., Goldman, 2006).  From this perspective, metacognition is both 
ontogenetically and phylogenetically prior to, and foundational for, mindreading. According 
to a third theory, proposed by Nichols and Stich (2003), mindreading and metacognition are 
underpinned by separate mechanisms; the “monitoring mechanism” is responsible for access 
to/awareness of one’s own mental states, whereas a separate “mindreading mechanism” is 
responsible for processing information about others’ mental states.  Crucially, both of these 
latter two theories imply that there should be some people who manifest diminished 
mindreading abilities, despite undiminished metacognition. Indeed, both Goldman, and 
Nichols and Stich explicitly suggest that people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) present 
precisely this pattern of impaired mindreading, but intact metacognition.   
 
Metacognition in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder diagnosed on the basis 
of social-communication deficits, and fixated interests and repetitive behaviours (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013).  It is widely acknowledged that ASD is characterised by 
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diminished mindreading ability (see Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998).   
However, until recently the question of whether metacognition is diminished among people 
with ASD has remained largely unexplored.   
The study of metacognition in ASD could have important implications for educational 
practice among individuals with ASD.  Metacognition in general and, more specifically, 
metamemory play key roles in aspects of learning and decision-making that we know people 
with ASD have difficulties with.  According to Nelson and Narens’ (1990) metamemory 
model,  information gained by monitoring one’s own memory feeds back to memory 
functioning, allowing individuals to control their learning efficiently. As such, having a good 
awareness of what one has learnt can improve an individual’s subsequent learning ability.  
For example, when revising for an exam, if an individual can accurately assess what 
information they already know, they are able to spend their time effectively, revising the 
topics they do not know. This issue may be particularly relevant for intellectually high-
functioning people with ASD, given that many of these individuals show significantly lower 
academic achievement than would be expected on the basis of their intelligence, which in 
turn impacts negatively on their life chances (see Estes, Rivera, Bryan, Cali, & Dawson, 
2011). Indeed, the educational domains in which people with ASD frequently under-achieve 
are just those in which learning is known to be fostered by metacognitive training.  Such 
training has been shown to remediate difficulties in reading comprehension (see Brown & 
Campione, 1996), writing (e.g., Sitko, 1998) and mathematical reasoning (e.g., Fuchs et al., 
2003).  In each of these domains, individuals with ASD show statistically significant under-
achievement, relative to IQ (see Estes, et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2009) . It is possible that 
diminished metacognitive monitoring contributes to the lower-than-expected levels of 
academic achievement in ASD in these areas.   
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 Thus, for several reasons it is important to establish the extent to which individuals 
with ASD show diminished metacognitive ability.  In a seminal paper, Frith and Happé 
(1999) argued explicitly that individuals with ASD are as impaired at metacognition as they 
are at mindreading.  More recently, Williams (2010) has taken up this idea, citing evidence 
that individuals with this disorder are as impaired at recognising their own and others’ 
thought processes (Hurlburt, Happé, & Frith, 1994), emotions (Williams & Happé, 2010a) 
and specific mental states, such as beliefs and intentions (Williams & Happé, 2010b), as they 
are at recognising these states in others. Evidence from “self” versions of classic mindreading 
tasks (e.g., Williams & Happé, 2009), in which participants are asked to report their own 
previously held (now false) belief, also suggests that individuals with ASD demonstrate 
diminished awareness of their own beliefs. Each of these findings suggests that 
metacognition is impaired in individuals with ASD, which appears in keeping with the view 
that mindreading and metacognition rely on the same underlying mechanism. As such, in our 
view, the evidence from studies of mental state attribution in ASD provides support for the 
one-mechanism account. 
However, some have argued that there is a critical limitation with these types of 
studies that prevents definitive conclusions being drawn about metacognitive ability in ASD 
(see Carruthers, 2009; Nichols & Stich, 2003).  The potential difficulty is that test questions 
in self versions of classic mindreading tasks require participants to recall their prior mental 
states, rather than report their current mental states.  Simulation and two mechanisms theories 
claim that only current mental states are directly accessible without the need for mindreading.  
Thus, arguably, the results from the above studies do not necessarily show that metacognition 
is impaired in ASD, because these tasks require inferences to be drawn about past mental 
states (but see Williams, 2010, for a counter-argument). 
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By contrast, it is widely agreed that metamemory monitoring judgements are based on 
awareness of current mental states.  As such, if the accuracy of metamemory monitoring is 
diminished among people with ASD, this would provide strong support for the suggestion 
that metacognition is diminished in ASD, contrary to the predictions that follow from the 
simulation/two-mechanisms theory.  In this regard, a seminal study by Farrant, Boucher and 
Blades (1999) reported no metamemory impairment in ASD.  This study was used by Nichols 
and Stich (2003) to support the suggestion that metamemory is unimpaired in individuals 
with ASD, and thus to support their two-mechanisms theory.  However, an issue with this 
study is that Farrant et al. assessed metamemory knowledge.  The one-mechanism account 
proposes that metacognitive monitoring/control, rather than metacognitive knowledge, 
necessarily relies on the same metarepresentational mechanism as mindreading.  As such, 
Farrant et al.’s study cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that all aspects of metamemory 
are typical in individuals with ASD.  At most, it suggests that the metamemory knowledge 
may be intact – the study did not assess metamemory monitoring or control.   
In order to unambiguously test whether metacognition is impaired in ASD, evidence 
is instead required from studies of metacognitive monitoring (or control).  Performance on 
FOK tasks relies on individuals monitoring current internal memory states.  Only one study 
to date has examined metamemory in ASD using a FOK task (Wojcik, Moulin, & Souchay, 
2013).  Wojcik and colleagues assessed children’s metamemory monitoring ability using two 
FOK tasks, one asking individuals to assess their memory for information stored episodically 
and one assessing memory for information stored semantically.  Wojcik reported that 
children with ASD were significantly poorer than typically developing children at making 
accurate FOK judgements, but only when assessing their episodic memory.  However, there 
is a particular methodological difficulty affecting Wojcik et al.’s (2013) study that arguably 
prevents valid conclusions from being drawn.  The difficulty is that the ASD and 
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neurotypical groups were not matched for verbal IQ (VIQ).  Matching for VIQ is essential in 
such studies, because differences between groups in this respect can potentially entirely 
explain between-group differences in experimental task performance (see Mervis & Klein-
Tasman, 2004).  Wojcik et al. (2013) recognised this limitation and tried to overcome it using 
an ANCOVA to “control” for group differences in VIQ.  However, ANCOVA does not, in 
fact, solve this problem (see Miller & Chapman, 2001)  and, thus, we cannot determine 
whether group differences were driven by diagnostic status or by VIQ differences.  In the 
current study, we explored FOK accuracy among ASD and comparison groups that were 
closely matched for VIQ, as well as for age, PIQ, and FSIQ.  If, as we predicted, between-
group differences in FOK accuracy were apparent, this would provide the first definitive 
evidence of a diminution of this ability among individuals with ASD.  
 
The Current Study 
The aim of this study was to explore the extent to which individuals with ASD are 
able to accurately monitor their own memory.  To examine this, a classic FOK task was 
employed.  Our main prediction was that participants with ASD would make significantly 
less accurate FOK judgments than comparison participants. During the FOK task different 
types of errors can lead to inaccurate FOK judgements; individuals can make over-confident 
errors (in which individuals incorrectly predict they will recognise a word that they 
subsequently fail to recognise) and also under-confident errors (in which individuals fail to 
predict their subsequently successful recognition of a target word). We predicted that 
individuals with ASD would make more FOK judgement errors overall, but would not be 
specifically biased towards over-confident or under-confident errors.   
Additionally, the Meta-cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 
1997) was also used, as a self-report measure of participants’ beliefs about their own 
metacognitive ability.  To our knowledge no study has previously assessed metacognitive 
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ability in individuals with ASD using a self-report questionnaire. It was predicted that 
individuals in the ASD group would report diminished confidence in and awareness of and 
their own thoughts, as reflected by lower scores on the cognitive self-consciousness sub-scale 
and higher scores on the cognitive confidence sub-scale of the MCQ.   
A measure of mindreading ability was also included in the current study. It was 
important to assess participants’ mindreading ability, because according to the one-
mechanism theory, metacognitive impairments should only be apparent if mindreading 
impairments are also present. To assess mindreading ability, we employed a version of the 
animations task (Abell, Happé, & Frith, 2000). During this task, individuals are asked to view 
a series of clips in which animated triangles interact with one another.  Participants are asked 
to provide descriptions of/explanations for the patterns of interaction between the triangles in 
each clip.  An adequate explanation of the triangles’ interactions requires the attribution of 
mental states (e.g., intentions, desires). We employed two conditions from the task, namely a 
mentalising condition and a goal-directed condition. Both of these conditions appear to rely 
on the mindreading system, although performance on the mentalising condition is thought to 
rely on mindreading to a greater extent than the goal-directed condition. Based on the 
findings from previous studies (e.g., Abell, et al., 2000; Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 
2014), we predicted that participants with ASD would show diminished overall performance 
on the animations task, but not a group (TD/ASD) by condition (mentalising/goal-directed) 
interaction on the task.   
 
Method 
 
A priori power analysis 
Prior to commencing the study, G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007) was used to conduct a power analysis to determine the sample size required to detect 
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the predicted group differences in gamma correlation on the FOK task.  In our view, no valid 
studies of FOK accuracy have been conducted among individuals with ASD.  Thus, for the 
purpose of this power analysis, we could not predict an effect size for the between-group 
difference in FOK accuracy based on effect sizes found in previous studies. Therefore, based 
on our theoretical inclination toward the one-mechanism view, we predicted that 
metacognitive impairments in ASD should be of a similar magnitude to the magnitude of 
mindreading impairments in this disorder.  As such, our prediction for the effect size 
associated with between-group difference in FOK accuracy in the current study was based on 
the effect size found for between-group differences in mindreading ability in studies of ASD.  
In a meta-analysis exploring mindreading ability in individuals with ASD compared to 
neurotypical individuals, Yirmiya and colleagues reported an average Cohen’s d of 0.88 
(Yirmiya, et al., 1998). Thus, assuming d = 0.88 for between-group differences in 
metamemory accuracy and α = .05, it was established that a total sample size of n = 17 
participants per group would achieve Cohen’s (1992) recommended power of .80.  
 
Participants 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from Durham University ethics 
committee. Eighteen adults with ASD (13 males, 5 females) and 18 neurotypical comparison 
adults (11 males, 7 females) took part, all of whom gave written, informed consent before 
participating. Participants in the ASD group had all received formal diagnoses of autistic 
disorder (n = 4) or Asperger’s disorder (n = 14), according to DSM or ICD criteria (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Heath Organisation, 1993).  
In order to assess current ASD features, 15 of the 18 participants in the ASD group 
completed Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) 
assessments. The remaining three participants declined to complete the ADOS, as they did 
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not feel comfortable being filmed. The three participants who did not complete the ADOS 
had rigorous diagnoses and scored above the cut-off on the Autism-spectrum Quotient (see 
immediately below). All participants who completed the ADOS received a total score ≥7, the 
defined cut-off for ASD (Lord, et al., 2000).  All participants completed the Autism-spectrum 
Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), a self-report 
questionnaire that assesses ASD/ASD-like features.  Fifteen out of 18 participants with ASD 
scored above the defined cut-off for ASD on the AQ (total score ≥26; Woodbury-Smith, 
Robinson, & Baron-Cohen, 2005).  Only three participants missed this cut-off.  However, all 
three of these participants scored well above the defined ASD cut-off on the ADOS (all 
ADOS scores among these three participants were ≥ 12). All comparison participants scored 
below the defined cut-off for ASD.  
No participants, in either group, reported using any psychotropic medication or any 
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders (apart from ASD). The participant groups 
were closely equated for verbal and non-verbal ability (see Table 1 for participant 
characteristics).  Verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ (PIQ), and full-scale IQ (FSIQ) were 
assessed using the full (four subtest) version of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). Groups were also closely equated for chronological 
age.  
 
Materials and Procedures 
 
Feeling-of-knowing task. The stimuli used in the FOK task were 80 word pairs, 
comprising of 160 concrete nouns (80 cue words and 80 target words). Cue words were 
matched with the target words for syllable length and word frequency (Kucera & Francis, 
1967), as reported in the MRC psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981).  The adequacy of 
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this matching was confirmed by a non-significant effect of word type (cue/target) in a 
multivariate ANOVA (using Wilks’ Lambda criterion) that included syllable length and word 
frequency as the dependent variables, F (2, 157) = 0.68, p = .93.   
The procedure for the FOK task consisted of a study phase, a cued-recall test phase 
(during which FOK judgements were also made; see below), and a recognition test phase (see 
Figure 1 for a graphical representation of one trial of the task). The task was run on an LG 
desktop computer and lasted approximately 25 minutes. Before completing the task 
participants completed a practice version of the entire procedure, consisting of five word 
pairs. As such, individuals knew before the study phase that their memory for the word pairs 
would be tested, both by a cued-recall test and a recognition test.  
Study phase. During the study phase, participants were presented with individual 
word pairs (e.g., “bear-bridge”), each consisting of a cue word (“bear”) and a target word 
(“bridge”). Each word pair was presented individually for four seconds. After the study 
phase, there was a five minute break, during which participants filled in the MCQ (see 
subsection below). After this break participants immediately completed the cued-recall test 
phase.  
Cued-recall and FOK phase. During the cued-recall phase, participants were shown 
individually presented cue words, in a random order, and were asked to recall the missing 
target word associated with each cue. Immediately after each recall attempt (i.e., on a trial-
by-trial basis), participants were asked to make a FOK judgement as to whether they thought 
they would be able to recognise the missing target word at a later point (either “Yes” or 
“No”). As such, participants made FOK judgements for all cue words, regardless of whether 
their recall of the target word had been accurate or not. However, in our statistical analyses of 
FOK accuracy, we only included judgements made on trials in which participants failed to 
recall the target. This procedure is common to studies of FOK ability among typically and 
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atypically developing populations. The procedure is designed to test participants’ ability to 
judge the likelihood that they will be able to recognise information they have failed to recall.  
Recognition phase. Immediately after the cued-recall phase, participants completed 
the recognition test phase. During the recognition test, participants were individually 
presented with all 80 cue words, in a random order, and were asked to identify the correct 
target word in a four-alternative, forced-choice recognition test. On each trial, participants 
were asked to click (using the computer’s mouse) the word they thought had been previously 
paired with the cue, from a selection of four options; the correct target word, an incorrect 
target word (that had previously been paired with a different cue word), and two novel 
distractor words not previously used in the task. Importantly, for a given cue word, all 
participants were shown the same four options to choose from. Once participants had clicked 
on a response the next trial began.  During the recognition test phase a target word only 
appeared as an option twice; once on a trial in which it was the correct target word and once 
on a trial as an incorrect target word. The same target word (appearing either as the correct or 
incorrect option) never appeared on two consecutive trials.   
Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire. The Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; 
Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) was used to assess participants’ beliefs about their own 
thoughts, and the efficacy of different thought processes. The MCQ presents participants with 
individual statements (e.g., “I have little confidence in my memory for words and names”) 
and participants were asked to decide the extent to which they agreed with each statement, 
responding on a 4-point likert scale, ranging from do not agree, agree slightly, agree 
moderately, to agree very much. The questionnaire consists of 65 items comprising five 
subscales.  We were interested in two of these subscales specifically.  The Cognitive 
confidence and Cognitive self-consciousness subscales each address participants’ awareness 
of their own thought processes and their confidence in their own cognitions, which are of 
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particular relevance to this study. In contrast, the remaining subscales addressed issues about 
worrying and the effects intrusive negative thoughts may have on one’s functioning, which 
seemed less related to the aims of the study,  
Animations task. During the animations task, participants were required to provide a 
verbal description of eight silent video clips, each of which displayed an interaction between 
a large red triangle and a small blue triangle.  These clips were taken directly from Abell et 
al. (2000). In four of the clips, an adequate explanation of the triangles’ interaction required 
the attribution of propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, intentions, and/or desires. As in 
Abell et al.’s study, these four clips comprised a “mentalising” condition (assessing higher-
level mindreading).  In the remaining four clips, an adequate explanation of the triangles’ 
interaction required the attribution of goal states, such as copying or following (lower-level 
mindreading), but not necessarily propositional attitudes. As in Abell et al. (2000), these four 
clips comprised a “goal-directed” condition.  
Each clip was presented to participants on an LG desktop computer and the order in 
which the experimental clips were presented was counterbalanced across participants. Before 
undertaking the experimental trials, participants also completed two practice trials, to 
familiarise themselves with the task (one goal-directed and one mentalising). During practice 
trials participants were asked to describe the behaviour displayed by the triangles in each of 
the video clips, and the experimenter gave feedback after each description. During the 
experimental trials, participants were asked to watch the clip and provide a running 
commentary, describing how the triangles interacted. During experimental trials a digital 
solid state audio recorder was used to record participants’ descriptions, which were later 
transcribed. No feedback was given on experimental trials.  
 
Scoring 
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Feeling-of-knowing task.  Two measures of participants’ basic object-level memory 
performance were calculated on the FOK task. Recall ability was calculated as the proportion 
of target words participants correctly recalled during the cued-recall-stage. Similarly, 
recognition ability was calculated as the proportion of target words participants correctly 
recognised during the recognition test phase of the task. Gamma scores (Goodman & 
Kruskal, 1954) were calculated to provide an index of overall FOK judgement accuracy. This 
analysis is recommended by Nelson (1984) and is commonly used to analyse FOK tasks (e.g., 
Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Nelson, Narens, & Dunlosky, 
2004; Wojcik, et al., 2013).  Gamma scores are a non-parametric measure of association 
(between predictions and actual performance) and were calculated by comparing the number 
of correct predictions that each individual made with the number of incorrect predictions they 
made. To calculate gamma scores the formula 𝐺 = (𝑎𝑑 − 𝑏𝑐)/(𝑎𝑑 + 𝑏𝑐) was used, with (a) 
representing the number of correct “Yes” predictions an individual made, (b) the number of 
incorrect “Yes” predictions, (c) the number of incorrect “No” predictions, and (d) the number 
of correct “No” predictions. Gamma scores range between + 1 to -1, where a score of 0 
indicates chance-level accuracy, a large positive value indicates a good degree of accuracy, 
and a large negative value indicates less than chance-level performance on the task. However, 
when calculating gamma scores, the score cannot be calculated when two or more of the 
prediction rates (a, b, c, or d) are equal to 0. As such, the raw data were adjusted by adding 
0.5 onto each prediction frequency and dividing by the overall number of FOK judgements 
made (N) plus 1 (N+1). This correction is recommended by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) 
and is routinely used when calculating gamma scores on metamemory tasks (e.g., Bastin et 
al., 2012; Wojcik, et al., 2013).  
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The number of errors made by participants in each group was calculated for two 
different types of errors in FOK predictions. The number of under-confident errors 
participants made was calculated as the number of incorrect “No” predictions, in which 
individuals failed to predict their subsequently successful recognition of a target word. The 
number of over-confident errors participants made was calculated as the number of incorrect 
“Yes” predictions made, in which individuals inaccurately predicted that they would 
recognise a word that they subsequently failed to recognise.  
Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire. MCQ Sub-scale scores were calculated for the 
Cognitive confidence subscale and the Cognitive self-consciousness subscale. Lower total 
scores on the Cognitive confidence sub-scale indicated a greater confidence in one’s own 
cognitions, whilst higher total scores on the Cognitive self-consciousness sub-scale indicated 
a higher reported awareness of one’s own thought processes.  
Animations task.  Voice recordings of participants’ commentaries were transcribed 
verbatim by an independent transcriber who was naïve to participants’ diagnoses and to the 
hypotheses of the study. These transcriptions were then scored by the first author and a 
second, independent rater (who was blind to the hypotheses of the study and the diagnostic 
status of the participants) on the basis of scoring criteria outlined in Abell et al. (2000). 
Participants’ descriptions of each animation were given a score of 0, 1, or 2 according to their 
level of accuracy, and defined as the extent to which the participant’s description captured the 
intended meaning of the animation.  As such, the total score achievable in each condition 
(mentalising/goal-directed) was eight.  Inter-rater reliability for scores across the eight 
animations was almost perfect, Cronbach’s α = .98. 
 
Statistical Analyses 
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A standard alpha level of .05 was used to determine statistical significance.  All 
reported significance values are for two-tailed tests.  Where ANOVAs were used, we report 
 values as measures of effect size (≥ .01 = small effect, ≥ .06 = moderate effect, ≥. 14 = 
large effect; Cohen, 1969).  Where t-tests were used, we report Cohen’s d values as measures 
of effect size (≥.0.20 = small effect, ≥ 0.50 = moderate effect; ≥ 0.80 = large effect; Cohen, 
1969).   
Results 
 
Feeling of knowing task 
 
Memory (object-level) performance.  Group differences in object-level memory 
performance were examined using independent-samples t-tests (see Table 2 for descriptive 
and inferential statistics). These indicated that individuals in the ASD group recalled 
marginally significantly fewer target words than comparison participants in the FOK task.  
However, no significant group difference was found in the proportion of target words 
correctly recognised in the FOK task.  
Metamemory performance.  Group differences in metamemory monitoring accuracy 
were examined (see Table 2 for descriptive and inferential statistics). An independent-
samples t-test indicated that there was a significant difference in gamma scores between the 
ASD and neurotypical group. Thus, in accordance with our predictions, participants with 
ASD were significantly poorer at predicting their own memory performance than were 
typically developing participants.  Nonetheless, one-sampled t-tests indicated that gamma 
scores were significantly above chance (i.e. significantly greater than 0) in both ASD and 
neurotypical groups, all ts > 2.47, all ps < .03. 
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An additional analysis was also carried out to investigate whether the marginally 
significant group difference in object-level recall of target words confounded performance at 
the meta-level of the task (i.e., FOK judgements). For the purpose of this analysis, two 
participants from each group were excluded to create ASD and neurotypical groups that were 
matched closely for recall ability, t(30) = 1.11, p = .28, d = 0.39. Groups also remained 
matched for chronological age, VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ (all ps > .33, all ds < 0.35). An 
independent-samples  t-test indicated that even when groups were equated closely for recall 
ability, FOK gamma scores were still significantly lower in the ASD group (M = .08, SD = 
.16) than in the neurotypical group (M = .25, SD = .16), t(30) = 2.99, p = .005, d = 1.06.  
Although participants with ASD made more errors overall during the task (as 
reflected by reduced gamma scores), they did not show a specific bias toward being more 
over-confident or under-confident in their predictions than neurotypical participants (see 
Table 2 for statistics).   
 
Self-report measure of metacognitive ability 
 
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for the two key MCQ subscale 
scores in the ASD and neurotypical group. A significant between-group difference was found 
in scores on the Cognitive self-consciousness subscale, indicating that participants in the 
ASD group believed they were superior at monitoring their own thoughts, and more aware of 
their own thought processes compared to comparison adults. There was no significant 
between-group difference in scores on the Cognitive confidence subscale.  
 
Animations task 
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Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for performance on the animations 
task. A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on these data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) 
entered as the between-subjects variable, and Animation Type (mentalising/goal-directed) 
entered as the within-subject variable. There was a significant main effect of Group on 
animations scores, reflecting the fact that participants with ASD performed significantly less 
well than comparison participants on the task overall, F(1, 34) = 9.02, p = .005,  = .21. 
There was also a significant main effect of Animation Type, indicating that, across both 
groups, scores were higher in the goal-directed condition than the mentalising condition, F(1, 
34) = 72.82, p < .001.  = .68. There was no significant Group by Animation Type 
interaction, F(1, 34) = 0.29, p = .59, = .01, suggesting that individuals in the ASD group 
were impaired at both higher- and lower-level mindreading, compared to individuals in the 
neurotypical group.  
 
Exploratory correlation analyses: Associations between metamemory ability, and 
mindreading ability and self-reported metacognitive skill 
A series of correlational analyses was carried out to explore the relation between 
performance in each condition of the animations (mindreading) task and performance on the 
FOK (metacognition) task. It should be noted that, although the current study was sufficiently 
powered to detect predicted group differences in FOK accuracy, it was not sufficiently 
powered to detect moderately-sized correlations (r = .30) between FOK accuracy and 
mindreading ability (see Discussion for further information regarding study power).  The 
following correlation analyses should, thus, be considered exploratory.  In summary, neither 
FOK accuracy (gamma score), nor the number of under-confident FOK errors made, nor the 
number of over-confident FOK errors made was associated significantly with performance in 
the mentalising condition of the animations task, performance in the goal-directed condition 
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of the animations task, or scores on either of the MCQ sub-scales, among ASD or comparison 
participants, all rs ≤ -.467, all ps ≥ .06.   
 
Discussion 
Until now, no study has established the extent to which individuals with ASD are able 
to accurately monitor their own memory by judging feelings-of-knowing, As such, the 
primary aim of this study was to establish this. In terms of the central experimental finding, 
the study found that participants with ASD showed significantly diminished FOK accuracy.  
This diminution was associated with a large effect size (d = 1.06), indicating a substantial 
difficulty with metamemory monitoring.  
This result is in keeping with our predictions that individuals with ASD would show 
impairments in metamemory monitoring. However, there are several potential explanations 
for the observation of diminished gamma scores in the ASD group1. One possibility is that 
individuals with ASD demonstrated a “positive illusory bias” during the task. The concept of 
a positive illusory bias refers to a tendency for an individual to self-assess their perceived 
competence as greater than their actual ability. This bias has been observed among 
individuals with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (see Owens, Goldfine, Evangelista, 
Hoza, & Kaiser, 2007). More importantly, some studies have indicated that individuals with 
ASD tend to self-report their own social functioning more positively than parents will report 
(e.g., Lerner, Calhoun, Mikami, & De Los Reyes, 2012), and will self-report the level of their 
own autistic traits as less severe than parents will report (e.g., Johnson, Filliter, & Murphy, 
2009).  These studies have been interpreted as suggesting that individuals with ASD may also 
show a tendency to manifest a positive illusory bias.  Demonstrating a positive illusory bias 
may indeed partly explain our finding that participants with ASD self-reported (on the MCQ) 
greater awareness of their own mental states than neurotypical comparison participants 
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reported.  This self-reported superior awareness among participants with ASD stood in direct 
contrast to their diminished performance on an objective, well-established measure of 
metamemory monitoring ability.  As such, the idea that some individuals with ASD manifest 
a positive illusory bias provides a plausible explanation for the MCQ findings.  
However, it is not apparent that a positive illusory bias can explain our central finding 
of diminished FOK accuracy among participants with ASD.   Individuals who manifest a 
positive illusory bias would, by definition, overestimate their memory ability and would, 
thus, be expected to make more over-confident errors when making FOK judgements.  In 
other words, diminished FOK accuracy among people whose judgements were driven by a 
positive illusory bias would be driven by over-confidence.  Yet, participants with ASD did 
not specifically make significantly more over-confident errors than comparison participants.  
Rather, individuals with ASD made less accurate FOK judgements overall, as a result of 
making both over-confident and under-confident errors. Participants with ASD showed a 
quantitative diminution of FOK accuracy, but did not appear to demonstrate a consistent 
qualitative difference in the kinds of error they produced. As such, it appears that 
demonstrating a positive illusory bias cannot explain the specific pattern of results shown in 
our study 
Another possible explanation for diminished FOK accuracy in the ASD group is that 
individuals with ASD may have been more inclined than comparison participants to make 
“yes” FOK judgements only when absolutely certain about their future memory ability.  This 
would again result in relatively inaccurate FOK judgements, because participants would end 
up being unduly under-confident about their future performance.  However, it is not apparent 
that this explanation can explain the specific pattern of results found in this study, given 
diminished FOK accuracy among participants with ASD was not driven by under-confident 
errors.  
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Instead, what can explain reduced gamma scores in the ASD group in an underlying 
problem with metacognitive monitoring in individuals with ASD (leading both to over-
confident and under-confident errors on the FOK task). These results have several potential 
practical and clinical implications. Ultimately, if an individual has a reduced ability to 
accurately assess what information they know, and what they do not know, this may have 
several consequences. From an educational perspective, studies have shown that several 
outcomes (such as exam performance) can be predicted by metacognitive monitoring 
accuracy (e.g., Hartwig, Was, Isaacson, & Dunlosky, 2012; Thiede, Anderson, & Therriault, 
2003). Findings that individuals with ASD show impaired metamemory monitoring need to 
be taken into account in educational environments, and should inform intervention efforts 
designed to remediate cognitive impairments in ASD. Studies in typical development have 
also shown that cognitive impairments can be remediated by fostering metacognition (e.g., 
Dunlosky, Kubat-Silman, & Hertzog, 2003).  Indeed, training metacognitive skills has been 
shown to remediate difficulties in reading, writing and mathematical reasoning (see Brown & 
Campione, 1996; Fuchs, et al., 2003; Sitko, 1998) in typical development.  The results of the 
current study make it plausible to suggest that diminished metacognitive monitoring ability 
contributes to educational underachievement in these areas among people with ASD.  If this 
turns out to be correct, it could have revolutionary effects on educational practices for people 
with ASD. We believe it is important for future research to build upon the current results by 
exploring the extent to which metacognitive impairments contribute to educational success 
among individuals with ASD.  
As well as having important educational implications, our central finding of reduced 
FOK accuracy in ASD also has theoretical implications.  The central findings of diminished 
FOK accuracy alongside diminished mindreading ability are in keeping with the predictions 
of the one mechanism theory of the relation between metacognition and mindreading.  Of 
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course, the results do not definitively prove the theory, but certainly they are not in keeping 
with a key prediction made by either the simulation theory or the two-mechanisms theory that 
metacognition is unimpaired in ASD. As such, the main results of this study provide some 
support for the one-mechanism account.   Having said this, we did not find a significant 
positive association between FOK accuracy and performance in either the mentalising or 
goal-directed conditions of the animations task.  The one-mechanism account would have 
predicted such associations between metamemory and mindreading, so the current results did 
not support the theory in this respect.  However, caution should be taken when interpreting 
the results of the correlation analyses. The exploration of associations between FOK task 
performance and animations (mindreading) task performance was carried out as exploratory 
analysis, and no a priori power analysis was conducted to establish that the study had 
adequate power for this secondary aim. A subsequent power analysis (after completion of the 
study) was conducted with a view to determining what sample size would have been 
necessary to detect meaningful, statistically significant associations between metacognitive 
monitoring ability and mindreading ability.  Assuming a moderate association (r = 0.30) and 
α = .05, a total sample size of n = 67 participants would be needed to achieve Cohen’s (1992) 
recommended power of .80 for the correlational analyses.  Thus, our study was under-
powered to detect a meaningful association between these two abilities.  This represents a 
limitation of our study and, as such, caution should be taken when interpreting the findings 
from our correlation analyses.  Future studies using larger sample sizes are warranted to 
further investigate relations between metacognitive monitoring and mindreading ability. 
What is clear is that the current study was sufficiently powered to detect predicted 
group differences in FOK accuracy and that results indicated participants with ASD showed a 
substantial diminution of metamemory monitoring.  Of course, there are other forms of 
judgement that can be used to assess metamemory, namely judgements of learning and 
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judgements of confidence. It remains possible that people with ASD will show undiminished 
accuracy in these judgements. Judgments of learning involve assessing how well one thinks 
one has learnt a piece of information, and judgements of confidence involve making 
retrospective judgments about how certain one is in one’s knowledge about a piece of 
information. The literature on typical development suggests that metamemory accuracy is 
only modestly correlated across different types of metamemory judgement (Kelemen, et al., 
2000; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990).  This has led to suggestions that different metamemory 
judgments may be based on different sources of information.  Metamemory judgements are 
thought to be based on mnemonic cues and it is possible that different judgements are based 
on different cues (see Koriat, 1993; Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993). Although we 
predict that individuals with ASD will demonstrate impairments across different 
metamemory judgements, this may not turn out to be the case. So far there have been only 
two published studies of judgment of confidence accuracy (Wilkinson, Best, Minshew, & 
Strauss, 2010; Wojcik, Allen, Brown, & Souchay, 2011). Results from these studies have 
been inconsistent; whereas Wilkinson et al. (2010) report that confidence judgments made by 
children with ASD were less accurate than those made by typically developing children, 
Wojcik and colleague report no impairments in JOC accuracy in children with ASD (Wojcik 
et al., 2011). Thus, the study of metacognitive monitoring in ASD is in its infancy and, in our 
view, a sustained study of metamemory and its neurocognitive basis in ASD would be 
fruitful.   
Future research should address these issues, and should also aim to address whether it 
is possible to foster metacognitive skills in individuals who do show impairments. In our 
view, a comprehensive investigation of metacognition in ASD is essential, given the 
consequences that impaired metacognitive monitoring and regulation may have on an 
individual’s cognitive performance. It is hoped that alongside future research the findings 
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from this study will help to establish a more definitive account of metacognitive ability in 
ASD, and that a greater understanding of this area will eventually contribute to successful 
remediation of cognitive and behavioural impairments in this disorder.  
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Table 1: Participant Characteristics (Means, Standard Deviations and Inferential Statistics) 
 Group    
 ASD              
(n = 18) 
Neurotypical 
(n = 18) 
t p Cohen’s d 
Age (years) 28.92 (10.27) 30.49 (14.54) 0.37 .710 0.12 
VIQ 111.67 (14.66) 112.28 (10.87) 0.14 .888 0.05 
PIQ 109.67 (15.75) 114.50 (10.96) 1.07 .293 0.36 
FSIQ 113.17 (15.22) 114.94 (10.50) 0.41 .686 0.14 
AQ Total Score 33.39 (9.24) 13.00 (6.22) 7.77 <.001 2.59 
ADOS Social + 
Communication Score* 
11.20 (3.57)     
 
AQ: Autism-spectrum Quotient; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; PIQ = 
performance IQ; FSIQ = full scale IQ; VIQ = verbal IQ  
*Based on 15/18 participants 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ASD = autism spectrum disorder; FOK = Feeling of knowing; MCQ = Meta-cognitions Questionnaire 
*Gamma scores index metamemory monitoring accuracy 
Table 2: Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in performance on the FOK task, MCQ,  and animations 
task 
Experimental Measure  Group     
  ASD Neurotypical  t p Cohen’s d 
FOK Task: Object-level 
memory performance 
Proportion of targets recalled .18 (.16) .31 (.22)  2.01 .052 0.68 
Proportion of targets recognised .68 (.23) .76 (.16)  1.29 .205 0.40 
FOK Task: Metamemory 
performance 
Gamma score* .09 (.16) .26 (.16)  3.25 .003 1.06 
 Number of over-confident judgments 9.56 (9.59) 6.11 (4.85)  1.36 .183 0.45 
Number of under-confident judgments 19.72 (11.54) 14.55 (7.69)  1.58 .123 0.53 
MCQ Cognitive self-consciousness subscale 21.24 (3.90) 16.89 (4.31)  3.12 .004 1.06 
 Cognitive confidence subscale 18.82 (4.14) 19.83 (5.17)  .635 .530 0.22 
Animations task Mentalising condition 3.78 (1.70) 4.89 (1.71)  1.96 .059 0.65 
 Goal-directed condition 5.83 (1.50) 7.22 (0.73)  3.52 .001 1.18 
     
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
1We would like to thank several anonymous reviewers of an earlier version of this 
article, who helpfully suggested several possible explanations for reduced gamma scores in 
the ASD group.  
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